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Abstract
This paper examines the e¤ects of Indias Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Act, currently the worlds largest public employment program,
on household consumption and poverty rates in rural India. Combining regionally
coded data from consumption surveys with information on the district-wise rollout of
the program, we employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate program e¤ects
during the years 2007 and 2008. We nd large, season-specic e¤ects among a tradi-
tionally deprived sub-group of the rural population, whose incomes are particularly
dependent on agricultural wage labor. We nd that for this group of households,
which accounts for thirty percent of Indias rural population, employment opportu-
nities under the scheme have cut poverty during the agricultural lean season by as
much as one half while we nd no e¤ect during the agricultural peak season. In a
cost-benet analysis we nd that consumption increases among this group of house-
holds are of the same order of magnitude as the wage outlays of the program. We
document that consumption among this group of households had previously exhibited
severe systematic seasonal uctuations and conclude that the employment program
has had a lasting e¤ect on consumption smoothing across agricultural seasons.
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1 Introduction
Poverty around the globe is concentrated in rural areas. For 2002, Chen and Ravallion
(2007) have estimated that more than two thirds of the 1.14 billion living on less than a
dollar per day resided in rural areas while, at the same time, the rural population share
gured at less than one third. Rural development and poverty alleviation programs have
been and continue to be popular, in particular in low and middle-income countries. Well-
known programs have involved cash-transfers, pensions, free or subsidized food provision
including school feeding programs, subsidized credit and directed lending, asset creation,
and various kinds of agricultural subsidies and extension work (Basu, 1991). In addition
to bringing down poverty gures, the declared purpose of most of these programs is to
help poor rural households to cope with various forms of risk (Lal et al., 2010).
A fundamental problem of all such programs is targeting, that is reaching out to the
most needy (Besley and Coate, 1992). When benets come at no cost for the recipients
and administrative capacities for ensuring proper targeting are limited, the benets from
welfare programs have often been found to be captured by wealthy and politically well-
connected households (Basu, 1991; Gaiha, 2000). An additional key challenge of programs
which aim at the mitigation of risks faced by poor households is that they have to be
exible and able to deliver immediate benets when a household experiences an income
shock (World Bank, 2013).
It is primarily on these grounds that public works programs have been popular with
governments around the globe (Subbarao, 2003). According to the World Development
Report 2014, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, around 150 public works programs are currently
active, and Subbarao (2003) enumerates several large-scale public works programs in Asia
and Latin America from the 1980s and 1990s. The e¤ort involved in the physical labor
has the potential to ensure proper targeting (Besley and Coate, 1992; Basu, 1991) and
households can decide on a day-to-day basis whether to supply their labor and receive
benets. In addition, public works programs have the potential to build growth-enhancing
local public goods (World Bank, 2013).
Ethiopias Productive Safety Net Program appears to have been the relatively most
costly recent public employment program in low and middle income countries, consuming
two percent of the countrys GDP in 2007 (Lal et al., 2010). Indias Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) has been the largest public works
program ever in terms of absolute outreach and cost, providing employment to fteen
percent of Indias workforce. In 2012, it accrued a cost of close to $10 billion, about one
percent of the countrys GDP. Introduced in 2006, the NREGA guarantees one hundred
person days of employment to every rural household whose adult members are willing to
perform unskilled manual labor at a statutory minimum wage.
Several recent papers have evaluated the Acts labor market e¤ects on a national scale
econometrically. Studies using National Sample Survey data on employment (Azam,
2012; Imbert and Papp, 2013; Zimmermann, 2012), as well as Berg et al. (2012), who
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use agricultural wage data from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, nd that the Act has
resulted in increases in agricultural wages. Moreover, female workers and marginalized
groups belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, formerly untouchables within
the Hindu caste system, appear to be among the main beneciaries of the Act.
While rural wages and rural consumption are likely positively correlated, particu-
larly among Indias rural poor (Lanjouw and Murgai, 2009; Berg et al., 2012), increases
in agricultural wages are merely a second order, general equilibrium e¤ect of a public
employment program. In our view, the net welfare e¤ects of this large employment pro-
gram have received too little attention in comparison. In this paper, we set out to assess
whether the NREGA has increased rural householdsconsumption, to what extent the
Act has helped rural households to smooth consumption, and whether the program has
been well-targeted as far as the distribution of welfare e¤ects over the rural population is
concerned.
We combine data from two waves of Indias nationally representative National Sample
Survey on household consumption with information on the district-wise rollout of the
NREGA. We make use of the phase-wise rollout of the Act. The NREGA was imple-
mented rst in 200 districts in the scal year 2006-07 (Phase I), in another 130 districts
in 2007-08 (Phase II), and in Indias remaining 263 districts in 2008-09 (Phase III).1 We
construct a district pseudo panel with consumption and program coverage data for the
agricultural years 2006-07 and 2007-08 to estimate program e¤ects on rural households
consumption expenditures and consumption-based poverty measures. To deal with po-
tential endogeneity in program placement, we employ a modication of Zimmermanns
(2012) regression discontinuity approach. We use an o¢ cial district backwardness index
published by Indias National Planning Commission in 2003, which has served as the basis
for allocating districts to di¤erent phases of the programs rollout. In this process, the
declared intention of policy makers has been to give more backward districts earlier access
to the program. Following Zimmermann (2012), we predict a districts actual program
status in 2007-08 by whether it is among the 130 most backward districts according to
the Planning Commissions index, and regress the outcomes of interest on program status
thus predicted. To be precise, we estimate local average treatment e¤ects of the Act,
where "local" pertains to the fact that our estimated e¤ects are for districts that are the
least backward among the 130 districts predicted to obtain the program in Phase II, or
equivalently the most backward among the 263 districts predicted to obtain the program
in Phase III.
To assess whether the Act has been well targeted, we study households belonging
to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/STs), which account for 29.8 percent of
Indias rural population according to the Census 2011 (Government of India, 2011), in
detail. In our sample, among scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, poverty is close to
three times the gure for the non-SC/ST population. Further, we assess to what extent
1These numbers are based on the 2001 Census denition of districts(Government of India, 2001). By
now, the Act is active in all 640 Census 2011 districts (Government of India, 2011).
2
NREGA employment has helped households to smooth consumption across agricultural
seasons. Given that, at least in backward districts, consumption used to plummet during
the agricultural slack season in spring, a particular focus of our analysis is on the Acts
e¤ect on seasonal consumption uctuations.
Our results are as follows. For the sample of all rural households residing in NREGA
Phase II and Phase III districts, we nd a statistically signicant e¤ect on neither the av-
erage level of consumption nor consumption-based poverty measures. For the sub-sample
of SC/ST households, in contrast, we nd large e¤ects on both average consumption and
poverty for the agricultural slack season in spring while there are no statistically signi-
cant e¤ects for the fall season. According to our point estimates, which are imprecisely
measured, the Act has increased SC/ST consumption during the spring season by as much
as 30 percent and halved poverty.
In addition to the econometric estimations, we also carry out a detailed descriptive
analysis of seasonal consumption patterns with National Sample Survey data from 2003
to 2012. We document that, prior to 2007-08, SC/ST households in NREGA Phase II
districts experienced far greater systematic consumption uctuations between fall and
spring seasons than in the generally better-o¤ NREGA Phase III districts. From 2007-
08 onward, in contrast, we nd substantially smaller di¤erences in seasonal consumption
and poverty patterns across these two groups of districts. Combining these descriptive
with the econometric results, our ndings are suggestive of a scenario where the Act
has reduced seasonal consumption uctuations for SC/ST households in Indias more
backward districts in a sustained fashion by increasing spring consumption to levels close
to those during the fall season.
We also conduct a rough cost-benet analysis of the NREGA by combining our esti-
mates with program expenditure data. According to NREGA expenditure gures, more
than 80 percent of the programs wage expenditures in Phase II districts during the agri-
cultural year 2007-08 occurred during the agricultural slack season, that is the spring
of 2008, when NREGA wages paid to SC/ST employees amounted to about Rs. 60 per
rural SC/ST individual. Per rural SC/ST individual, our most conservative point esti-
mates predict an increase in monthly average individual consumption due to the NREGA
of around Rs. 70. We conclude that the programs wage expenditures have been cost-
e¤ective in increasing slack-season consumption of SC/ST households, even if our point
estimates of the programs e¤ect on consumption are overstated.
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature on welfare e¤ects of rural anti-
poverty and development programs. To name only a few examples, Djebbari and Smith
(2008), among many others, study welfare e¤ects of the Mexican PROGRESA condi-
tional cash transfer program. Duo (2003) studies the e¤ect of old-age pensions on child
nutrition in South Africa. Kochar (2005) and Tarozzi (2005) estimate nutritional e¤ects
of Indias public food distribution system. Rural credit expansion and poverty in India
and Bangladesh is the subject of Burgess et al. (2005) and Pitt and Khandker (1998).
Moyo et al. (2007) analyze the e¤ect of agricultural extension on poverty in Uganda. Re-
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garding public works programs prior to the NREGA, most existing econometric studies
focus on targeting rather than welfare and poverty (Jayne et al., 2002). An exception
is Datt and Ravallion (1994), who nd a moderate poverty-reducing e¤ect of the Maha-
rashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, a predecessor to the NREGA active in only one
of Indias states. Regarding the NREGA, most existing empirical research by economists
is on labor market rather than welfare e¤ects (see the citations above). Exceptions are
Afridi et al. (2012), who nd a positive e¤ect on child schooling in data from six districts
in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Scandizzo et al. (2009) nd that the NREGA smooths
household income in two villages in the state of Maharashtra. Under the assumption that
the manual labor required to receive NREGA benets is a burden for program partici-
pants, Lagrange and Ravallion (2012) propose to correct welfare and poverty e¤ects by
the disutility from working on NREGA sites and illustrate this conceptual approach with
cross-sectional National Sample Survey data from the state of Bihar.
In terms of the study object, welfare e¤ects of the NREGA, the following three papers
are closest to ours. Ravi and Engler (2009) use a small panel data set of 320 households
residing in the state of Andhra Pradesh and nd that consumption expenditures increase
by about ten percent in response to the Act. Their program e¤ect estimates are based on
propensity score matching and, in our view, rely on rather strong identifying assumptions.
Deininger and Liu (2013) use a panel of 4,000 households residing in the same state. With
three waves of data from 2004, 2006 and 2008, they perform double and triple di¤erences
estimations and propensity score matching. Similar to our empirical results, they nd
that the program was well targeted and had large e¤ects on food consumption and asset
accumulation, particularly among SC/STs and casual laborers, whose magnitudes exceed
the value of direct transfers. Our analysis di¤ers from these studies in four regards. First,
in terms of scope, we consider all major Indian states. Second, our empirical identication
strategy does not rely on parallel trend assumptions, which we nd not to hold in various
placebo estimations. Third, we consider e¤ects not only on consumption averages, but
also on consumption-based poverty. Fourth, and most importantly, we unfold the seasonal
pattern of program e¤ects and show how the NREGA has not only reduced poverty levels
but contributed to consumption smoothing. Bose (2013) uses two waves of Indian National
Sample Survey data to estimate the e¤ect of the rst phase of the NREGA on consumption
and poverty. Employing a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation technique with Phase I as
treatment and Phase III as control group, which requires strong identifying assumptions,
her estimated program e¤ects are similar to ours.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the NREGA in some
detail and present the data used in our analyses. We introduce our empirical approach
and identication strategy in Section 3. Section 4 contains the empirical results, Section 5
various robustness checks and extensions. A cost-benet analysis is the subject of Section
6. The nal section concludes.
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2 Background and Data
2.1 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
The NREGA, enacted in 2005 by the United Progressive Alliance government, was envi-
sioned as a safety net for rural households. Under the Act every rural household is entitled
to 100 days of work at the statutory minimum wage, which is set by the respective state
government. The NREGA guarantees employment within 14 days to any rural resident
who is willing to work, irrespective of income level, gender, caste, or religion. The Act
includes a provision for an unemployment allowance in case of failure to provide work
within this time frame. The NREGA as a policy instrument is remarkable in two ways;
rst because of its rights-based approach and, second, its provisions for transparency and
accountability (Khera, 2011). As to the rst, the NREGA marks a move away from doling
out benets to recognizing certain basic entitlements, including the notion of a right to
work and to a minimum income. The NREGA also draws strongly on the spirit of the
Right to Information Act, enacted in 2006, by dening provisions for enabling transparent
and easily accessible administrative records, as well as processes for public scrutiny and
accountability of o¢ cials toward beneciaries. As a result, since its implementation in
2006, it has been closely monitored by civil society, which in turn has helped to expose
several instances of corruption (Vanaik and Siddhartha, 2008a,b).
The NREGA is not the rst public works program in post-independence India. The
National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP) implemented between 2004 and 2006,
is viewed as the predecessor of the NREGA. The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee
Scheme, enacted in 1977 and active until the inception of the NREGA, has received some
interest by researchers in the past (Basu, 1981; Drèze, 1990; Ravallion et al., 1993).
The NREGA started in 200 districts, which we will refer to as Phase I districts, in the
scal year spanning from April 2006 to March 2007. In April 2007, another 130 districts
started implementing the Act (Phase II), and in April 2008 all remaining 263 districts
were covered (Phase III). The spatial pattern of districtsallocation to the three phases
is mapped in Figure 1. We identify Phase II and Phase III districts as published on the
o¢ cial website of the Ministry of Rural Development (Government of India, 2013c). From
the same source we collected year, district, and month-wise program intensity data. In
our subsequent analysis, where we approach the NREGA rollout as a natural experiment,
we focus on the scal year 2007-08 and regard Phase II districts as treatment group and
Phase III districts as control group. We disregard Phase I of the NREGA for two reasons.
First, in the 200 Phase I districts, the NFFWP had been operating up to the initiation
of the NREGA making it di¢ cult to separate e¤ects of the NREGA from those of the
NFFWP. Second, unlike for Phase II and III districts, we are not aware of a convincing
empirical strategy addressing the problem of selection of districts into this Phase.2
2See, however, Bose (2013) for a comparative analysis of Phase I and III districts in the scal year
2006-07.
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Planning Commission Backwardness Index
In the subsequent analyses we employ a district-wise backwardness index published by
Indias National Planning Commission (Government of India, 2003). For 447 districts in
Indias major states, this index is calculated from three sub-indices, percentage of SC/ST
population, agricultural output per worker, and the agricultural wage rate. The nal
composite index gures between 0.078 (most backward) to 2.159 (least backward). This
index has served as the basis for allocating districts to each of the three phases of the
NREGA (Zimmermann, 2012). In our empirical analysis we use this index for dealing
with selection problems in district-wise program status assignment. Unfortunately, the
index is available for only 92 and 163 of the NREGAs 130 Phase II and 263 Phase III
districts, respectively. All districts listed by the Planning Commission belong to the
seventeen major Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat,
Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharasthra, Orissa, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. As our identication strategy
can only accommodate districts for which the Planning Commissions backwardness index
is available, our subsequent analysis is restricted to those 255 Phase II and III districts
for which the backwardness index is available.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents key program statistics for our sample of 92 Phase II districts during
the scal year 2007-08.3 According to Table 1, seventy percent of the programs expen-
ditures of about Rs. 30 billion were spent on wages. Given a population of 25.5 million
households, this amounts to Rs. 840 per rural household residing in these districts. Em-
ployment in NREGA works and thus NREGA expenditures follow a marked seasonal
pattern. They peak during the dry spring season when labor demand in rural areas plum-
mets. To illustrate, Figure 2 depicts NREGA wage expenditures per rural inhabitant (not
per NREGA worker) in our sample districts by month. Accordingly, wage expenditures
per rural inhabitant stood at less than Rs. 10 per month during the rst six months of
Phase II for which program expenditure data is available (May to October 2007). This
gure more than tripled to about Rs. 30 per month during the agricultural o¤-season, the
rst half-year of 2008. During the same period, monthly wage expenditures amounted to
Rs. 55 per capita among SC/ST households. The same gure also demonstrates that this
cyclical expenditure pattern continues into the scal year 2008-09.
2.2 Household Welfare
In our main empirical analysis, we use the 63rd and 64th round of the Indian National
Sample Surveys (NSS) consumption expenditure module. These two rounds cover the
3For a discussion of the quality of o¢ cial NREGA program data see Drèze and Oldiges (2011).
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agricultural years July 2006 to June 2007 and July 2007 to June 2008. Our reason for this
choice of rounds is as follows. For a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation of the program
e¤ect of NREGAs Phase II with one baseline and one endline wave of data, we are bound
to use the 64th round as endline since this is the only agricultural year in which the Act was
active in all Phase II districts but in none of the Phase III districts.4 The natural choice for
the baseline is the 63rd round canvassed in 2006-07. In comparison to prior rounds, such
as the large 61st or the slightly smaller 62nd round, using a baseline as close to the endline
as possible minimizes the e¤ect of confounding factors, which we expect to be numerous
given Indias rapid rate of transformation during the 2000s. There is an additional reason
in favor of the 63rd, and against the 61st round, which serves as baseline in Azam (2012)
and Zimmermann (2012). The summer monsoon rainfall (June to September) of 2004 was
more than fteen percent below the long-term average for India as a whole resulting in a
kharif (fall) crop failure (Government of India, 2012), while the monsoon rainfalls during
the three following years were exceptionally similar with deviations from the long-term
average of -1.3, -0.4 and +5.7 percent in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively (Government
of India, 2014). Hence, as far as weather conditions are concerned, the three agricultural
years covered by the 62nd, 63rd and 64th round are similar in terms of weather conditions,
which is mirrored by growth rates of the agricultural gross domestic product of 5.1, 4.2
and 5.8 percent, while there was zero growth in 2004-05 (Government of India, 2012).
We will revisit the issue of alternative baselines when we address the robustness of our
empirical results.
In all our analyses, a household is the unit of observation; we do not aggregate welfare
outcomes at the district-level. Throughout, we use the sampling weights provided with
the NSS data, which are meant to ensure that consumption aggregates calculated from
the household-level data are representative for the rural population at the individual (not
the household) level. While Indias National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) points
out that consumption estimates are representative at the district level for neither the 63rd
nor the 64th round because of a sample size which is small by NSS standards (Chaudhuri
and Gupta, 2009), we shall point out here that random sampling within each district is
su¢ cient for consistent estimation of program e¤ects within our empirical approach. The
smaller numbers of observations in these two "thin" rounds (on average 14,000 households
rather than 32,500 in the "thick" 61st round) will merely reduce the estimation precision.
Our key outcome variable of interest, Monthly per Capita Consumption Expenditure
4This statement is not exactly true as the program commenced in the Phase III districts with the
beginning of the scal year 2008-09, that is in April 2008. However, this occurred at a low intensity
with average monthly wage expenditures per capita of less than Rs. 10 in April and May of 2008, which
compares to an average of Rs. 34 in our Phase II sample districts. While the former gure increased
to Rs. 23 during the month of June, the resulting total wage expenditures per capita during the rst
half-year of 2008 in our Phase III sample districts amount to no more than Rs. 42, which compares to
Rs. 204 in our Phase II sample districts. Moreover, since we expect some lag between wage disbursement
and householdsconsumption, and since the interviews conducted by the NSS rely on a thirty day recall
period, we regard the start of NREGA in the Phase III districts in April 2008 as a minor threat to our
empirical approach, which treats Phase II districts as treatment and Phase III districts as control group.
Nonetheless, we will revisit this issue in the robustness checks section.
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(MPCE), takes into account a mixed recall period applied by the NSSO, thirty days for
high-frequency items and 365 days for certain lumpy expenditure items. In line with
common practice (Deaton, 2008), all prices are deated to constant 2004-05 prices using
the monthly Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPI-AL).5 At 0.5 percent
per month, rural ination was similar to the overall rate of ination in India during the
time period we consider, July 2006 to June 2008. We calculate two poverty measures based
on MPCE gures and state-wise poverty lines suggested by the Tendulkar Commission
(Government of India, 2009), the headcount ratio (HCR), P0; and the poverty gap ratio
(PGR), P1 (Foster et al., 1984). The 2004-05 Tendulkar poverty line for rural India,
which equals Rs. 446.68 (about 30 US Dollars, purchasing power parity concept) is higher
than the previously common Indian national poverty line, equal to Rs. 356.30 (or $23)
(Government of India, 2007). Hence the Tendulkar poverty measure captures roughly
"one dollar a day" poverty. We also experimented with poverty measures based on the
traditional national poverty line but faced a problem of too little estimation precision
because less than fteen percent of the rural population in our sample districts is poor
by that denition. For the Tendulkar poverty line, this gure stands at 32 percent in our
sample.
Summary statistics for the sample of all rural households and the sub-sample of SC/ST
households for the 63rd and 64th NSS round are set out in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Each table gives sample means by year, phase, and season. For considerations of space,
we have opted not to report standard deviations or standard errors. In accordance with
the general trend since the 1990s, there is a decline in poverty in both samples. Both in
Phase II and Phase III districts and across both groups of households, poverty according
to the headcount ratio and the poverty gap ratio has declined between 2006-07 and 2007-
08. At the same time, as expected, poverty in Phase II districts is higher than in Phase
III districts in each of these two NSS rounds.
There are marked seasonal variations in the distribution of consumption, in particular
its lower part, by NREGA phase. For the sample of all rural households, there is an
increase in poverty as measured by the headcount ratio from fall to spring in Phase
II districts in both rounds while the opposite is true in the less backward Phase III
districts. Such a pattern is in line with smoother consumption across seasons in more
forward districts. Given the general secular decline in rural poverty in India, a smooth
consumption path across seasons implies a slight decrease in poverty from fall to spring
in each agricultural year and hence NSS round. It is only the less backward Phase III
districts that achieve such a pattern, however, while consumption in Phase II districts
mirrors the annual agricultural cycle, where the bulk of agricultural activity, employment
and yield occurs during the monsoon-fed kharif (fall) season.
5 Indias Labour Bureau provides these gures online (Government of India, 2013a).
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3 Empirical Approach: Regression Discontinuity Design
In this section, we lay out our estimation strategy. While the papers by Azam (2012),
Berg et al. (2012), Imbert and Papp (2013) as well as Bose (2013) all rely on the phase-
wise rollout of the program and use di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation techniques to
identify labor market e¤ects of the NREGA, Zimmermann (2012) casts doubts on the
identifying assumptions behind such an approach. The intention of the phase-wise rollout
of the program has been to bring the program to Indias poorest districts rst. The critical
identifying assumption of a di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis which uses Phase II districts
as the treatment and Phase III districts as control group is that time trends are parallel
between the baseline and endline, 2004-05 and 2007-08 in Azam (2012), for example,
across Phase II and Phase III districts, that is between two groups of districts with
markedly di¤erent baseline characteristics. While Azam (2012) nds no evidence against
such a parallel time trend assumption in employment data spanning the time period 1999
to 2005, we nd strong evidence against this assumption in NSS consumption data from
the 2005-06 and 2006-07 NSS rounds (see below). In our view, this is not surprising.
Given that monthly per capita consumption expenditures were more than twenty percent
higher in Phase III relative to Phase II districts in 2006-07, our baseline year, Phase II
and Phase III districts likely also exhibit markedly di¤erent structural features, such as
access to nancial and other markets and non-farm employment opportunities for rural
households. That such structural features are predictors of subsequent growth and poverty
reduction rates has been shown for Indian states by Datt and Ravallion (2002) and is, in
our view, likely for districts, too.
To provide intuition for our empirical identication strategy, consider the union set of
Phase II and III districts and suppose that, within this set, Phase II status was assigned to
only the 130 most backward districts according to the Planning Commissions 2003 district
backwardness index. Under the identifying assumption that expected consumption growth
in a district is continuous in the Planning Commissions (PC) backwardness index, a
local average treatment e¤ect of the NREGA could be estimated using a sharp regression
discontinuity design (RDD) by regressing consumption growth of a district between 2006-
07 and 2007-08 on a exible polynomial in the PC backwardness index and a dummy for
belonging to the 130 most backward districts. Notice that, in this case, such a dummy
equivalently captures Phase II status. That dummys regression coe¢ cient would yield a
consistent estimate of the programs expected e¤ect for a district whose PC backwardness
index is at the Phase II - Phase III cuto¤ value.
The way the NREGAs Phase II was implemented deviates from such a clean scenario
in two ways. First, the assignment of Phase II status to districts was implemented at
the state rather than at the national level. This means that, in a rst step, each state
s was prompted to nominate a given number of districts, ms say, for Phase II with the
guideline that the states poorest districts as measured by the PC backwardness index
are to be given priority. Second, because of constraints in administrative capacity or
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other reasons such as political favoritism (Gupta, 2006), no state government nominated
precisely the ms poorest districts - as measured by the PC index - within its boundaries.
Instead, some districts that should have been nominated following the PC index rule did
not obtain Phase II status while some less backward districts in the same state did.
The rst complication can be addressed by implementing a regression discontinuity
design for each state. The required identifying assumption is that, within each state,
a districts expected consumption growth rate conditional on the districts PC index is
continuous in the latter. The second complication can be resolved by employing a fuzzy
RDD at the state level. Toward this, a districts consumption growth rate is regressed on
predicted Phase II status, where the prediction is based on the districts PC backwardness
index and the state-wise PC index rule, rather than actual Phase II status. The addi-
tional two identifying assumptions needed for this procedure are, rst, that a districts
probability to be in Phase II is continuous in its PC index and, second, that there is
a discontinuous jump in this probability at the state-specic threshold value of the PC
backwardness index.
We implement this latter procedure in two steps. Consider a district as the unit of
observation. In the rst step, for each district of state s, we predict the probability of
being notied in Phase II based on whether the district is among the ms most backward
districts of that state according to the PC index. In the second, consumption growth in
each district is regressed on the predicted Phase II probability from the rst step and a
exible polynomial in the backwardness index.
For practical purposes, Zimmermann (2012) suggests to use each districts within-
state PC backwardness rank rather than the index itself and to force the polynomial of
all states to be identical. More precisely, for each state, we rank the union set of all Phase
II and III districts in descending order of the Planning Commissions index. Denoting
the PC backwardness index for district d in state s by xsd, we consider a districts rank
among the Phase II and III districts of the same state, ranksd. To be precise, we dene
ranksd =
nsX
i=1
1fxsi  xsdg;
where ns is the number of Phase II and III districts in state s and 1fg denotes the
indicator function. Recall that xsd is smaller, the more backward the district. Then, the
way ranksd is dened, the least (most) backward district of state s is assigned the rst
(nsth) rank. Taking ms as given for each state, we dene the centered rank of a district
within its state by cranksd; where
cranksd = ranksd  ms:
Notice that, within each state, the centered rank of the least backward district that would
obtain Phase II status if, within that state, selection of Phase II districts was based solely
on the PC index, equals zero. Accordingly, the dummy variable 1fcranksd  0g tells
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whether district d of state s should be a Phase II district if, in each state, districts were
allocated to phases following the PC backwardness index strictly.
Using local linear regression as recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010), our rst
stage estimating equation is
Phase2sd = cs+
1fcranksd  0g+1 cranksd+2 cranksd 1fcranksd  0g+usd; (1)
where Phase2sd equals one if district d in state s has Phase II status and usd is a stochastic
error term. Notice that we allow for state-specic intercept terms and a di¤erent slope
of the regression function to the left and the right of the cuto¤ value. Figure 3 plots
the relative frequency of Phase II status averaged over all seventeen states in our sample
over the variable crank together with a piece-wise linear regression function in the forcing
variable, which includes a jump at zero. We have trimmed the sample to include only
districts whose crank is no greater than ten in absolute value. There clearly is a downward
jump in the data where the centered rank equals zero. This is mirrored by our rst
stage estimation results, which are set out in the rst column of Table 4. Accordingly,
conditional on a districts within-state centered rank, its probability to be in Phase II
increases by 67.3 percent if it is among the states ms poorest districts.
While the rst estimation stage is for a cross-section of districts, our second stage is
for a repeated cross-section of households forming a district pseudo panel,
ysdit = sd + st + 
dPhase2sd D0708t + 1 cranksd D0708t (2)
+2 cranksd  1 fcranksd  0g D0708t + sdit;
where y denotes an outcome of interest, i and t are subscripts for households and time
periods, respectively, and sdit is a stochastic error term. There are two time periods,
one for each of the NSS rounds canvassed in 2006-07 and 2007-08. The dummy variable
D0708t equals one if an observation is from the latter NSS round. For estimating (2),
we use the survey weights provided by the NSSO. This second stage can be viewed as a
modied di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimating equation for a district pseudo panel. The
rst modication is the addition of a control variable, the centered within-state rank,
which is assumed to be related to the outcome variable in a piece-wise linear fashion, the
second one the use of a predicted value for a districts Phase II status rather than the
districts actual program status.
Our estimation strategy as laid out in (1) and (2) gives each district an equal weight
in the rst stage while each districts implicit weight in the second stage estimation equals
its population share. An alternative, more standard, approach to the estimation of the
program e¤ect would be to estimate (2) with Phase2sd substituted for dPhase2sd by instru-
mental variables, where Phase2sd is treated as endogenous regressor and 1fcranksd 
0g  D0708t is used as identifying instrument (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In such a
specication, each district is given the same weight, its population share, in both esti-
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mation stages. The resulting point estimate of  is a Wald estimator, the extent of the
discontinuity in the outcome variable of interest divided by the extent of the discontinuity
in the probability of being notied in Phase II. An essential feature of our subsequent
empirical analysis is that we will consider alternative subsets of households. In the instru-
mental variables approach, the rst stage estimation results and hence the denominator
of the Wald estimator of the program e¤ect depend on the district weights implied by
the respective subset of households that is being considered. As the vector of implied
district weights varies greatly across the sub-samples which we will consider, the instru-
mental variables approach yields substantially di¤erent program e¤ect estimates in two
alternative sub-samples, even if the discontinuity in the outcome variable of interest is
exactly the same in both sub-samples. System (1) and (2), on the other hand, avoids
this artefact because the program e¤ect estimates for di¤erent sub-samples are essentially
Wald estimators with an identical denominator.6 We will revisit this issue in Section 5.4.
We close this section with a discussion of the computation of standard errors for
our two-stage approach. As shown by Murphy and Topel (1985), ordinary least squares
standard errors are biased when a "generated regressor" is used, as in our second stage.
Another complication regarding the calculation of standard errors is that, for each of the
two NSS rounds, we want to allow for a non-zero correlation among the error terms of
households residing in the same district. Since we were not able to nd explicit formulas
for standard errors when there is a generated regressor as well as the need for clustering,
we calculate clustered standard errors as if there was no generated regressor in (2) and
correct those standard errors as suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985; equation 17)
for non-clustered standard errors by the factor
q
1 + b2MSE1=MSE2; where b is the
estimate of  from an ordinary least squared estimation of (2) and MSEk denotes the
mean squared error from estimation of the kth stage estimating equation. We realize
that such an approach is somewhat ad hoc. On the other hand, it is beyond the scope
of this paper to assess whether the resulting standard errors are consistent. Therefore,
in Section 5.4, we also estimate a standard two stage least squares version of system (1)
and (2), where consistent clustered standard errors are available, without obtaining any
qualitatively di¤erent results - that is with respect to sign and statistical signicance -
from the ones reported in the next section.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Our outcomes of interest are individual consumption and consumption-based poverty
measures. Table 5 contains the coe¢ cient estimates of  in (2) for alternative dependent
6While the point estimate of  in our approach does not exactly equal the ratio between the second-
stage and the rst-stage discontinuity, none of the point estimates in Table 5 di¤ers from that ratio by
more than 1.5 percent of the respective standard error.
12
variables and di¤erent (sub-)samples of households. We also report the number of districts
for which there are observations in both the 63rd and the 64th NSS round as our estimates
of the programs e¤ect are based on only such districts. For all regressions whose results
are reproduced in this table, the predicted values of Phase II status for each district are
obtained from the estimation of (1) whose results are set out in the rst column of Table
4. In all regressions, the sample is trimmed such that only districts with a crank of no
more than ten in absolute value are included.
Standard errors are calculated as described above, that is we conduct an ordinary least
squares estimation of (2), calculate clustered standard errors, where a cluster is the set of
households residing in the same district in a given NSS round, and adjust the standard
error for b thus obtained according to equation 17 in Murphy and Topel (1985). The
correction factor that obtains for the estimations whose results are set out in Table 5
never exceeds 1.1. All results in Table 5 are estimated from the 2006-07 and 2007-08 NSS
rounds. From the upper left panel, it is evident that the trimming results in a loss of
54 districts, 201 instead of 255. Since the 63rd NSS round fails to contain one of these
201 districts, there are 401 clusters. Comparing the upper and center left panels, we see
that 23 percent of the households that are sampled in the two relevant NSS rounds and
reside in either a Phase II or a Phase III district, belong to scheduled castes or scheduled
tribes. That this fraction is substantially smaller than the share of SC/ST households
in all rural households, 26.5 percent, is due to the sampling stratication employed by
the NSSO, by which relatively wealthy households are systematically oversampled in thin
survey rounds (see Table 6). While the sampling methodology in both NSS rounds ensures
that almost all districts are represented in each round, SC/ST households are not sampled
deliberately. Hence, even if there are SC/ST households in each district, random sampling
within each district results in no SC/ST households being interviewed in some districts.
Comparing the upper and center left panels of Table 5, we see that this has happened in
three instances, that is district-year pairs. A loss of clusters also occurs when we consider
observations from only one of the two agricultural seasons, that is July to December or
January to June. Comparing the center left with the two panels to its right, we see that
such random drawing of the interview date results in a loss of twenty and sixteen clusters
in fall and spring, respectively.
In each panel, the column "MPCE" has logarithmic monthly per capita consumption
expenditures at constant prices as dependent variable, while in columns HCR and PGR,
the headcount ratio and poverty gap ratio are the dependent variables, respectively. As
pointed out previously, the estimated e¤ects are not average treatment e¤ects for the set
of all Phase II districts, but local treatment e¤ects capturing the expected program e¤ect
for a household residing in a district that is on the edge of being allocated to Phase II or
Phase III as predicted by the districts backwardness index.
Turning to the estimation results, there are only small and statistically insignicant
results for our full sample. For SC/ST households, we estimate an increase in logarithmic
consumption and economically signicant decreases in poverty when pooling the obser-
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vations from both agricultural seasons (center left panel). The disaggregated seasonal
analyses for SC/ST households reveal that the e¤ects for the full year are entirely driven
by the spring season, where we nd large increases in consumption expenditures and
decreases in poverty. Albeit imprecisely estimated, the center right panels entry in the
MPCE column implies that SC/ST consumption expenditures have increased by 37.3 per-
cent on average due to the presence of NREGA sights during the agricultural lean season,
the spring of 2008. Turning to the poverty measures, our estimates imply a reduction
in the incidence of poverty as measured by the headcount ratio of 45 percentage points
and a decrease in the poverty gap measure of 11.7 percentage points. These e¤ects are
very large taking into account the 2006-07 reference values of 69.3 and 19.8 for these two
measures. The limited number of observations in the seasonal SC/ST analyses, each of
which comprises only a little more than a tenth of the observations in our full data set,
and the loss of clusters due to random sampling results in a considerable loss in estimation
precision and a lamentable increase in standard errors.
For reference, Table A1 contains estimates of  for a variation of (2) in which actual
Phase II program status, Phase2sd; is substituted for predicted program status dPhase2sd.
Such a specication amounts to a standard di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation of the
NREGAs program e¤ect. While it allows for di¤erent time trends in the outcome variable
across districts by centered rank, it fails to purge any bias in the estimation of  arising
from selection issues. Such a bias will occur in particular if, absent the NREGA, a
district that is assigned Phase II (III) status with a centered rank greater (weakly smaller)
than zero exhibits a systematically di¤erent growth rate in the outcome of interest than
predicted by that same districts crank. To make a case, suppose that districts that should
have been in Phase II according to the state-wise PC index rule, that is Phase2sd = 1 if
and only if cranksd  0, but end up in Phase III, have an especially poor administrative
capacity. If administrative capacity of a district is positively correlated with its rate of
consumption growth absent the NREGA, then such selection will bias an estimate of 
upward because on average the growth rate of a district actually in Phase II is greater
than predicted by its crank and the converse is true for Phase III districts. Regarding
the seasonal pattern of program e¤ects, the point estimates obtained from this approach
exhibit marked qualitative di¤erences relative to the ones obtained from our two stage
procedure for the sample of SC/ST households. As expected, the coe¢ cients are estimated
much more precisely when actual rather than predicted Phase II status is used. We will
turn to the credibility of these di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates in the context of a
placebo experiment in the next section.
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5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
5.1 Alternative Sub-sample of Vulnerable Households
In this subsection we consider an alternative subgroup of especially poor and vulnerable
households, rural laborers. This is facilitated by the fact that the NSS consumption ques-
tionnaires report the households principal occupation. While we would have preferred
to look at only agricultural laborers, we found the resulting sub-sample too small. The
union set of agricultural and other laborers, in contrast, is of a similar size (twelve percent
larger, to be precise) as the one comprising all SC/ST households. According to the de-
scriptive statistics for our base year 2006-07 in Table A2, this groups and SC/STs welfare
characteristics, as captured by consumption and poverty, are very similar. Rural laborers
average monthly per capita consumption expenditure, headcount ratio and poverty gap
ratio gure at Rs. 513, 51.4 percent and 12.3 percent in 2006-07, which compares to Rs.
497, 52.7 percent and 13.5 percent among SC/STs, respectively. Still, the two subgroups
overlap only partially. In the data set that we use for our core analysis, 26.5 percent
of the population belong to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and 36.2 percent are
laborers. A little more than half of the SC/ST population report themselves as laborers.
As a consequence, fteen percent of the population in our full sample are both SC/ST
and laborers, which implies that the majority of laborers, 58 percent to be precise, does
not belong to scheduled castes and tribes. Analogous to our core analysis, we estimate
system (1) and (2) with the sub-sample of rural laborers only. According to the bottom
panel of Table 5, there is no statistically signicant e¤ect of the NREGA for this part of
the rural population.
We end this subsection by pointing out that the sub-sample of SC/ST households is
our preferred group of especially vulnerable households. Classication as rural laborer
is in response to a question regarding the households principal occupation, where the
three relevant categories for our purposes are laborer, self-employed, and other. In this
connection, we fear two potential problems in conjunction with the NREGA. The rst
one is a selection issue. The presence of NREGA sights creates additional non-farm em-
ployment opportunities, which may a¤ect a households choice of principal occupation.
For example, the extra availability of non-farm employment may prompt a household
head that would have formerly reported himself as working primarily as agricultural la-
borer to report the household as doing primarily non-agricultural labor. Such an e¤ect
of the NREGA should not jeopardize the consistency of our analysis of rural laborers
welfare because we consider the union set of agricultural and non-agricultural laborers.
Among marginal farmers, however, it is conceivable that NREGA employment opportu-
nities prompt some households to move from the category self-employed in agriculture to
laborers. As a consequence, the laborer sub-samples in our baseline and endline rounds
would, in general, not be comparable. The second issue may be labelled reporting bias.
The answer to the occupational question is based on a perception of the household head.
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Even if the households own occupational activities do not change with the NREGA, the
change in behavior among peer households, in this case working more in non-farm wage
employment, may a¤ect a households perception of its principal occupation. Any of
these two e¤ects is likely to result in biased program e¤ect estimates, even within our
identication framework.
5.2 Migration
A concern that arises in the context of our analysis is that the program potentially alters
migration incentives and hence the composition of the rural population in the Phase II
and III districts di¤erently between the baseline and endline surveys. For the Mexican
PROGRESA, for example, Stecklov et al. (2005) nd that exposure to PROGRESA
reduced out-migration to the United States by about one fth while it did not a¤ect
domestic migration in a measurable way. Given a rate of out-migration to the US of
less than a one percent per year, however, such a program e¤ect on migration would not
severely jeopardize an analysis like ours, where baseline and endline together span no
more than two years.
In rural India, migration is substantial. According to the 2001 Census of India, the
annual rate of rural-urban migration stood at around seven percent per year. Our results
of substantial welfare improvements among SC/ST households would be jeopardized if
the availability of NREGA sights increased the rate of out-migration among especially
poor households or decreased the rate of out-migration of especially wealthy, non-poor
households. In such a scenario, improvements in poverty due to the NREGA would merely
be due to a relocation of poverty away from the rural areas of the Phase II districts.
Using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation approach and NSS migration modules from
two years, Ravi et al. (2013) nd that the NREGA drives down migration in Phase II
districts by as much as a quarter. Similarly, in a study of two north-western states of
India, Imbert and Papp (2014) nd that the NREGA reduces short-term migration of
rural laborers. Such a pattern would lead to a systematic increase in the population of
Phase II districts relative to our control (Phase III) districts. While these authors do not
explicitly disaggregate migration ows by initial wealth, both papers nd that the entire
e¤ect of NREGA on migration is driven by laborers, which are far more likely to belong
to the poorer half of the rural consumption distribution (see Table A2). This implies
that the migration e¤ect of NREGA will result in lower average consumption in Phase
II districts - as one would expect intuitively. Hence, our estimates regarding household
welfare should be conservative ones.
5.3 Placebo Experiment (or Falsication Test)
In this subsection, we assess the validity of one of the identifying assumptions underlying
our two-stage analysis. In particular, we test whether a districts expected growth rate
conditional on its crank does not exhibit a discontinuity at crank equal to zero absent
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the NREGA. Toward this, we estimate system (1) and (2) with data from the 62nd and
63rd NSS round.
Sample means for the 62nd NSS round are set out in Table A5. The results of this
exercise are set out in Table 7. For all sub-samples, the point estimates are far from being
statistically signicant. The standard errors for the sub-sample of SC/ST households are
around forty percent larger in the placebo than in our core analysis, which is due to the
smaller number of observations in the 62nd NSS round relative to the 64th. This raises the
issue whether the placebo analysis su¤ers from a lack of power. The absolute magnitude
of the greatest point estimates obtaining in the placebo, SC/ST during fall, is still only
about a half of those for SC/ST during spring in our main estimations, which we take as
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there is no discontinuity in a districts expected
consumption growth rate at the crank-cuto¤ absent the NREGA.
Another potential issue with our placebo is that the NREGA started to operate in
Phase II districts in April 2007. Hence, in our Phase II districts, the last three months of
the 63rd round may be a¤ected by the onset of the NREGA. As Figure 2 shows, however,
this occurred at a very low intensity. In particular, no wage expenditures are recorded
for the month of April 2007 and the somewhat greater expenditures during June 2007 are
unlikely to a¤ect June consumption as the consumption data are based on a mixed recall
of thirty and 365 days. In line with this argument, all three point estimates for SC/ST
households during spring are small and insignicant.
Table A3 sets out the results of a placebo experiment for a di¤erences-in-di¤erences
version of (2), where Phase2sd is substituted for dPhase2sd: There are large and signi-
cant placebo e¤ects for all rural households during the fall season and for SC/ST house-
holds during spring. Accordingly, consumption growth and poverty reduction between
the spring seasons of 2006 and 2007 was about twice as large as between 2007 and 2008.
Taken together, we conclude from the results of the two placebo experiments that the
parallel time trend assumption underlying a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach is clearly
violated while the identifying assumptions of the fuzzy regression discontinuity design
appear to be valid.
5.4 Sampling Weights and Two-stage Least Squares Implementation of
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
As discussed in Section 3, our empirical specication as laid out in (1) and (2) assigns
equal weights to all districts in the rst stage while each districts weight in the second
stage estimation is equal to its population share. This is the fundamental di¤erence to a
textbook implementation of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, which amounts to two
stage least squares estimation (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The latter can be implemented
by conducting an instrumental variables estimation of (2) with Phase2sd substituted fordPhase2sd, where Phase2sd is treated as endogenous regressor and 1fcranksd  0g 
D0708t is used as identifying instrument. In such a specication, each district is assigned
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the same weight in each estimation stage, which equals its population share.
To illustrate the sensitivity of the Wald estimator of the program e¤ect to the choice
of sub-sample within this approach, columns 3 to 8 of Table 4 set out alternative rst
stage results of a standard instrumental variables version of system (1) and (2). The third
column, which uses data from all rural households, gives results very similar to the rst
column. On the other hand, between the last two columns, which are for the sub-samples
of SC/ST households during fall and spring, respectively, the di¤erence in the estimated
jump varies by almost a quarter.
As expected, the magnitude of estimated coe¢ cients, which are set out in Table 8, is
even more dramatic than in Table 5 for the sub-sample of SC/ST households during the
spring season. On the other hand, the order of magnitude and the pattern of statistical
signicance across the di¤erent sub-samples is unchanged, at least as far as the ve percent
signicance level is concerned. We take this as support for the validity of our procedure for
calculating the standard errors in our preferred specication. As an additional robustness
check, we also carry out a placebo estimation using instrumental variables estimation and
data from the 62nd and 63rd NSS rounds. According to Table A4, as in Table 7, none of
the estimated coe¢ cients is statistically signicant at conventional levels.
A third possibility of weighting districts in the two stages of the estimation is to
give each district an identical weight in both stages. This corresponds to Zimmermanns
(2012) approach, who carries out all estimations with district averages. Such an approach
yields a program e¤ect estimate which is representative for an average district at the
cuto¤ of the centered rank, while the estimates set out in Table 5 are representative
for the population in districts located around the cuto¤. Asymptotically, the resulting
coe¢ cients of interest will be di¤erent if the local average treatment e¤ect is heterogenous
with regards to district population size. The results of this exercise are set out in Table
9 and conrm our previous ndings qualitatively. The point estimates are much smaller
with this alternative weighting scheme, however, and only logarithmic monthly per capita
consumption of SC/ST households during the spring season increases in a statistically
signicant fashion.
5.5 Regression Discontinuity Design Applied to only Endline Data
Our estimation strategy in the main empirical analysis can be thought of as a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design applied to changes in welfare outcomes between two years,
where the relevant unit of observation is a district and district averages for each of the two
years of data are calculated from household-level data in a rst step. One key identifying
assumption of such an approach is that the expected change in average household welfare
in a district conditional on the districts backwardness index is continuous in that index
absent the NREGA. Over the last ten years, panel RDD analyses have become common
in empirical economics and have been applied fruitfully in many di¤erent contexts (see
Lee and Lemieux, 2010, for references).
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In this subsection we explore a simpler RDD specication using a cross section of
districts with data from the endline survey only, that is from 2007-08. This corresponds
to the fuzzy RDD textbook case. The underlying identifying assumption then is that the
level of expected average household welfare in a district conditional on the backwardness
index is continuous in that index absent the NREGA. The estimation continues to proceed
in two steps. The rst step (1) for predicting Phase II remains una¤ected. The estimating
equation for the second step now becomes
ysdi = s + 
dPhase2sd + 1 cranksd + 2 cranksd  1 fcranksd  0g+ sdi;
where all observations for y are from the 64th NSS round. We expect this approach
to have less power because pre-program di¤erences between districts become unobserved
heterogeneity in this cross-sectional approach.
The results are set out in Table 10. While the pattern of the signs of the estimated
coe¢ cients is the same as in Table 5, none of the estimated e¤ects is statistically signicant
at the ve percent level, which comes as no surprise given our just-mentioned reservations
regarding the power of such an approach in our small sub-samples.
5.6 Alternative Baseline Year
In this subsection, we explore the 62nd NSS round as an alternative baseline round. We
see two advantages and two disadvantages using the 62nd in place of the 63rd round as
baseline. Turning to the disadvantages, we expect the residual variance to be greater
because of a longer time spell between baseline and endline. Second, all estimates will be
less precise as the sample size in the 62nd round is only about half of that of the 63rd
round. On the other hand, unlike the 63rd, the 62nd round as a baseline is not a¤ected
by the onset of the NREGA in April of 2007. Finally, compared to the 63rd round, it
has a sampling strategy more similar to that of the 64th round. As set out in Table 6,
both the 62nd and 64th round follow the Indian NSSOs usual second stage stratication
strategy, where an equal number of wealthy and non-wealthy households is interviewed in
each block that has been drawn for inclusion in the NSS sample. It is only the denition
of "wealthy" that varies across these two rounds. In particular, land ownership serves as
criterion in the 62nd round while it is the possession of certain assets in the 64th. The 63rd
round, on the other hand, has the singular feature of initially stratifying by participation
in public works. If the sampling weights, which the NSS includes with each observation,
were correct, variations in the second-stage stratication across survey rounds should not
matter. Given the sensitivity of various ndings derived from these surveys, e.g. regional
poverty trends, to other survey features, such as the recall period (see, e.g., Deaton and
Kozel, 2005), we are somewhat sceptical about variations in the sampling methodology,
however. In particular, since SC/ST households demand NREGA employment much more
often than non-SC/ST households, we suspect that the stratication by public works
employment in the 63rd round could lead to a misrepresentation of such households, even
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when using the weights supplied by the NSSO.
To assess this possibility, we estimate system (1) and (2) with the dependent variable
equal to a dummy which takes the value of one if the interviewed household belongs
to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe. We would like to stress that, as in all other
regressions, we use the weights provided by the NSSO. Hence, in principle, the estimated
e¤ects are representative for the entire rural population. For the baseline and endline
years underlying our main analysis, the results are set out in columns 1, 3 and 5 of the
upper panel of Table 11. According to column 1, the incidence of SC/ST individuals has
dropped by 12.8 percentage points in response to NREGAs Phase II. This point estimate
is signicant at the ve percent signicance level and driven by the fall season, for which
the point estimate equals more than fteen percent. For the spring season, there is no
statistically signicant e¤ect. We have carried out the same exercise with the dependent
variable rural laborer, whose results are set out in columns 2, 4 and 6 of the upper panel.
Again there are statistically signicant e¤ects of the NREGA, albeit of opposite sign.
The lower panel of Table 11 sets out the results of the same exercise with the 62nd and
64th rounds of NSS data. For SC/STs, all estimated e¤ects are small and statistically
insignicant. Taken together, the pattern of results across the two panels is suggestive of
di¤erences regarding the populations that are represented in the 62nd and 64th round on
the one hand, and the 63rd round on the other.
Sample means for the 62nd round are set out in Table A5 for SC/ST households. The
results for system (1) and (2) with the 62nd round as baseline are set out in Table 12.
They conrm our ndings for SC/STs during the spring season both qualitatively and
quantitatively. As expected, the precision of the point estimates deteriorates relative to
our main results in Table 5.
5.7 Timing of NREGA Onset and Consumption Survey Interviews
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the program commenced in Phase III districts in April 2008.
While this occurred at a very low intensity, in principle this onset of the program in our
control group of districts potentially biases our program e¤ect estimates. This applies
in particular to the spring season, for which consumption interviews take place between
January and June. While we expect our program e¤ect estimates set out in Table 5 to
be downward-biased in this scenario, we repeat our main analysis for SC/ST households
during the spring season with consumption interviews held only during the rst quarter
of 2007 and 2008. The results are set out in column 6 of Table 13. With less than 1,500
observations, for logarithmic MPCE we continue to nd a statistically signicant e¤ect
very similar in magnitude to the one in Table 5. The e¤ects for the two poverty measures,
on the other hand, are muted and insignicant.
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5.8 Trimming, Functional Form of the Regression Discontinuity Design
and Control Variables
As pointed out by Lee and Lemieux (2010), unlike in many instances of panel data xed
e¤ects estimation, panel RDD regression equations do not require the inclusion of any
controls or xed e¤ects to ensure consistent estimation of causal e¤ects. The essential ex-
planatory variables are a polynomial in the continuous forcing variable, here the centered
rank, and a dummy for the discontinuity, each interacted with an endline dummy. In
this subsection we explore alternative specications of our system of estimating equations
regarding the choice of trimming, xed e¤ects and control variables. For considerations of
space, we discuss only results for SC/STs during spring. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 13 set
out results for di¤erent extents of trimming. Neither widening nor narrowing the crank
window by ve steps changes our main results in a remarkable way, though narrowing
decreases the precision greatly. In this context, it is to be noted that further trimming,
as in column 1, results in a loss of a third of the districts used in our main estimations.
We also explore a local polynomial regression with distinct quadratic polynomials to
the left and right of the cuto¤. To be precise, the rst stage in this specication is
Phase2sd = cs + 
1fcranksd  0g+ 1 cranksd + 2 crank2sd
+1 cranksd  1 fcranksd  0g+ 2 crank2sd  1 fcranksd  0g+ usd
and the second stage
ysdit = sd + st + 
dPhase2sd D0708t + 1 cranksd D0708t + 2 crank2sd D0708t
+1 cranksd  1 fcranksd  0g D0708t + 2 crank2sd  1 fcranksd  0g D0708t + sdit:
According to column 3 of Table 13, our previous ndings continue to obtain under this
modication and the point estimates are larger.
Column 4 is as our main specication but without state-endline year interactions. To
be precise, the terms cs and st in (1) and (2) are replaced by c and t, respectively.
As the point estimates show, our main results are robust to these two omissions but the
estimated e¤ects are muted. Figure 4 depicts the reduced form corresponding to system
(1) and (2) with c and t substituted for cs and st, respectively,
ysdit = sd + t + 
1fcranksd  0g D0708t + 1 cranksd D0708t
+2 cranksd  1 fcranksd  0g D0708t + sdit;
for logarithmic MPCE. Accordingly, there is an estimated downward jump at the dis-
continuity of 17.5 percentage points, which, once divided by the estimated jump in the
probability of being notied under Phase II, 0.75 (see column 2 of Table 4), roughly gives
the point estimate in the fourth column of the upper panel of Table 13, 22.98.
Finally, in column 5 we have added dummies for di¤erent household sizes as explana-
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tory variables, so the interpretation of the estimated program e¤ect is conditional on
household size. Our main ndings continue to obtain, albeit slightly muted in magnitude.
6 Cost-Benet Analysis
We rst summarize the empirical ndings obtained thus far. While we have not found
statistically signicant program e¤ects for the sample of all rural households and the sub-
sample of rural laborers residing in NREGA Phase II and Phase III districts, we have found
very large and statistically signicant local average treatment e¤ects on consumption
growth and poverty reduction for the subgroup of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes
during spring, which is the agricultural lean season. While all point estimates in our
disaggregated analyses su¤er from a lack of precision, the pattern of the Acts welfare
e¤ects as elicited by our ndings is clear. The main beneciaries are households belonging
to a particularly deprived subgroup of the rural population and the e¤ects occur during
the season in which the risk of consumption shortfalls is greatest. For the subgroup
of SC/STs, consumption gains are especially large in the lower part of the consumption
distribution. Given the lack of precision in the respective estimations, we view the pattern
of welfare improvements generated by the NREGA as the major insight of our empirical
analysis, rather than the point estimates, which we think should be taken with a grain of
salt.
Figure 5 depicts the estimated e¤ect on consumption expenditures among SC/ST
households in a stylized fashion. The solid and the dashed line depict fall and spring
consumption in 2006-07, respectively, by district backwardness. The location and slope
of the two lines imply that, in backward districts, spring consumption falls considerably
short of fall consumption, while fall and spring season consumption are similar in the
less backward districts with a crank greater than zero. This is in line with the sample
means set out in the center left and bottom left panels of Table 3. Accordingly, Phase
II districts experienced a consumption drop of about eighteen percent from fall 2006 to
spring 2007 while Phase III districts enjoyed an increase of about two percent. In terms
of Figure 5, our results imply a program e¤ect resulting in an upward shift of the left part
of the dashed line. To be precise, the estimated local average treatment e¤ect only tells
that there is an upward shift at zero, the cuto¤ value of the centered rank. For the gure
we have implicitly assumed a homogeneous treatment e¤ect of the NREGA with regards
to a districts centered rank, which implies a parallel shift upwards of the dashed line to
the left of zero. The resulting new situation clearly implies smoother consumption across
the two seasons for SC/ST households in backward districts, and this is in fact what the
sample means in the center right and bottom right panels of Table 3 imply. Accordingly,
mean per capita consumption increased by about two percent for both the Phase II and
III districts from the second half-year of 2007 to the rst half-year of 2008.
To assess whether the NREGA has had a lasting impact on seasonal consumption
patterns of SC/ST households, Table A5 sets out SC/ST consumption and poverty by
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NREGA phase and season for all NSS rounds featuring a consumption expenditure module
since 2003. The upper panel covering the agricultural year 2003-04 is calculated from
two rounds, the 59th and 60th, as the former covers the calendar year 2003 and the
latter only the rst half-year of 2004. Figure 6 depicts the time series of logarithmic
MPCE among households belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes by NREGA
phase together with all-India agricultural production for each half-year from fall 2003 to
spring 2012. Two stylized facts emerge from the table and gure. First, consumption
averaged over an agricultural year tracks agricultural output closely in both groups of
districts, that is consumption smoothing across years is far from complete irrespective of
NREGA phase status. Second, prior to the NREGA, the risk of a consumption shortfall
during the second half of an agricultural year is far greater in Phase II than in the less
backward Phase III districts. To be precise, according to Table A5, average logarithmic
consumption is lower in spring than in fall in Phase II districts in all years up to 2006-07,
while Phase III districts enjoyed a moderate increase in logarithmic consumption at the
same time. This seasonal consumption pattern in Phase II districts is in accordance with
the seasonality in agricultural output, which is on average roughly ten percent larger in fall
than in spring. Given an increase in logarithmic consumption between 2003-04 and 2011-
12 of 14.5 and 20.1 in Phase II and Phase III districts, respectively, a perfectly smooth
consumption path involves an increase in logarithmic consumption of 0.90 and 1.25 from
fall to spring in each agricultural year, respectively.7 It is evident from Table A5 that
Phase III districts get much closer to such a pattern than Phase II districts prior to the
NREGA. In particular, for the four agricultural years between 2003-04 and 2006-07, intra-
year changes in logarithmic consumption averaged at -8.1 in Phase II compared to +4.5 in
Phase III districts with standard deviations equal to 7.5 and 3.4, respectively. In the three
consumption surveys available since 2007-08, the mean changes between the two seasons
of the same agricultural year are -0.1 and +1.1, respectively, with standard deviations
equal to 3.5 and 3.8, respectively. A related fact that emerges from Figure 6 is that the
consumption paths of Phase II and Phase III districts co-move much more closely from
2007-08 onward. To elaborate, the correlation coe¢ cient between the two consumption
time series is -0.15 up to the spring of 2007 and +0.96 afterwards. Together, we take
these facts as suggestive evidence for a sustained e¤ect of the NREGA on consumption
smoothing among SC/ST households in backward districts.
The pattern of program e¤ects that we nd is consistent with the pattern of NREGA
program expenditures. Regarding the beneciaries of the program, Table 1 tells that al-
most half of all NREGA work days in our sample was performed by SC/STs. The gures
imply that non-SC/ST individuals performed only 1.23 person days on average, about
a third of the 3.51 person days performed by a representative individual from scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes. Regarding seasonality, Figure 2 plots monthly NREGA wage
expenditures in our samples 92 Phase II districts relative to the rural population and
7There are sixteen half-years between January 2004 and January 2012. The two numbers 0.90 and 1.25
are obtained from dividing 14.5 and 20.1 by sixteen, respectively.
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wages paid to SC/STs relative to the rural SC/ST population. Accordingly, expenditures
between January and June 2008 were on average three times the expenditures during the
agricultural peak season in the fall of 2007. Combining the information on NREGA ex-
penditures with our point estimates, we conclude that the estimated increases in SC/ST
consumption are large relative to NREGA wage expenditures. The monthly wage ex-
penditures of close to Rs. 60 per SC/ST capita during the spring season of 2008 come
together with estimated consumption benets of between Rs. 61 and Rs. 140, depend-
ing on whether we take the smallest of our point estimates for MPCE from Table 10 or
the one from our preferred specication (Table 5). Hence, the Act appears to have been
cost-e¤ective in improving welfare among SC/ST households by reducing exposure to sys-
tematic seasonal consumption shortfalls. This conclusion continues to hold even if our
point estimates overstated the true e¤ect by a factor of two or four. A qualication that
has to be made regarding the methodology of this cost benet analysis is that we have
compared our local average treatment e¤ect as an estimate of the benet of the program
to the cost measured as an average di¤erence between Phase II and III districts.
Deininger and Liu (2013) nd similarly large short-term e¤ects, of Rs. 140 per month,
on SC/ST consumption in Phase II and III districts in the state of Andhra Pradesh. These
authorsndings also imply that the welfare e¤ects exceed the direct transfers to workers
from the program. As their data cover only the agricultural peak season, however, their
analysis does not address the seasonal pattern of program e¤ects.
In principle, there are three channels by which income of poor rural households may
benet from a public employment program, rst, wage income increases from more days
of employment due to work on the NREGA sites, second, wage income increases from
earnings in non-NREGA employment due to an increase in the equilibrium wage rate in
the rural labor market and, third, income increases from wage labor and self-employed
activity due to a higher marginal product of labor, which arises from the infrastructure
put in place by NREGA work. As Berg et al. (2012) point out, the third of these chan-
nels appears to be negligible in the context of our analysis. Given that we consider only
the rst year of the programs second phase and that much of the activity unfolded not
before January 2008, it is unlikely that household consumption beneted much from such
infrastructure by the rst half-year of 2008. Regarding the second channel, Berg et al.
(2012) nd that impacts on non-NREGA wage rates are lagged by about nine months,
which is at odds with Zimmermann (2012), who nds a large instant, but imprecisely
estimated, e¤ect of the NREGAs Phase II on female casual wages during the fall season
of 2007, that is when the program operated at a low intensity in the Phase II districts
compared to the rst half-year of 2008 (see Figure 2). Our empirical analysis leaves
open the potential contributions of the just-mentioned three channels to the consump-
tion increases that we estimate. Moreover, in principle, NREGA employment and the
high female participation rate may also a¤ect consumption through changes in household
savings or intra-household decision making processes. Still, a rough calculation with Zim-
mermanns estimates suggests that the e¤ect on female private-sector wages will result
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in a per capita monthly income increase of no more than Rs. 15 (this is based on a ve
person household with two female laborers) while the program expenditure data in Figure
2 implies that NREGA employment increases monthly per capita income by around Rs.
35 during the rst half-year of 2008 (which is based on the assumption that no private
sector employment is crowded out and that the programs wage expenditures fully reach
the employed laborers). Hence, our impression is that the NREGAs short-term e¤ect on
consumption in Phase II districts is mostly attributable to the programs direct e¤ect on
householdslabor incomes rather than any of the indirect, general equilibrium, e¤ects.
7 Concluding Remarks
Governments of low and middle-income countries around the globe have been and are
using large-scale public employment programs to provide livelihood security and combat
poverty in their rural areas. Given that more than a third of the worlds rural poor
who live on less than a dollar per day resided in India in 2002 (Ravallion et al., 2007),
assessing the costs and benets of Indias thus far largest public employment program is
of immediate interest. We have embarked on our analysis of welfare and poverty e¤ects
of Indias National Rural Employment Guarantee Act arguing that a pure labor market
perspective is certainly important in its own right but not su¢ cient to judge an employ-
ment programs e¤ect on rural householdslivelihoods. Previous, often qualitative, eld
studies have claimed that many workers employed under Indias NREGA use their public
workswages for goods and services which they previously considered prohibitive, like
bicycles or childrens education (Khera, 2011). In this paper, we have explored quantita-
tively whether NREGA employment opportunities have translated into higher levels and
smoother patterns of consumption at an all-India level.
While we have not found statistically signicant program e¤ects in a sample repre-
sentative for the entire rural population in the districts that we study, we have found
economically and statistically signicant poverty-reducing e¤ects for the sub-sample of
households belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes during spring, which is the
agricultural slack season. Our econometric ndings for the time period 2006 to 2008 com-
bined with patterns emerging from descriptive statistics for the years 2003 to 2012 suggest
that the NREGA has helped this group of households in a sustained fashion to smooth
consumption between the agricultural peak and slack seasons. Our main conclusion is
hence that the NREGA has been successful not only in increasing consumption levels
of particularly vulnerable households but also in reducing these householdsexposure to
the risk of seasonal drops in consumption. The pattern of these e¤ects is consistent with
the pattern of program expenditures. We have documented that, in our sample, about
one in two workers on NREGA sites belongs to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe,
and that the bulk of NREGA work is carried out during the spring season. Combining
this information with our estimated welfare e¤ects, we conclude that much of the public
workswages appear to have contributed to additional consumption by marginalized rural
25
households during the agricultural o¤-season.
The text of the Act itself species among the main goals of the scheme "ensuring
livelihood security for the poor" and "ensuring social protection for the most vulnerable
people living in rural India" (Government of India, 2013b). In the language of econo-
mists, the former calls for risk reduction while the latter highlights the aspect of proper
targeting. Our analysis suggests that the Act has successfully delivered on both of these
two objectives.
In our view, the main shortcoming of our empirical analysis is the low precision of
the estimated program e¤ects, which is rooted in three reasons. First, we identify pro-
gram e¤ects from district-wise changes in consumption and there are only 255 districts
available for our analysis. Second, our analysis relies on so-called thin rounds of Indias
National Sample Survey, where the sample size is comparatively small. Third, we conduct
disaggregated analyses by agricultural seasons and population subgroups, which cuts the
size of our sample further by a factor of up to ten. To deal with these complications,
rst, we have employed a modication of the usual instrumental variables implementa-
tion of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, which substantially reduces the variability
of program e¤ect estimates in our small samples when program status is assigned at a
higher than the individual level, in our case the district. Second, we have carefully ex-
amined the validity and robustness of our main ndings by subjecting them to numerous
robustness checks and extensions. Third, we have pointed out that we view the seasonal
and subgroup-specic pattern of welfare improvements generated by the NREGA as our
major insight, rather than the magnitude of the point estimates.
Finally, there are limitations to the scope of our analysis. Driven by the objective to
identify causal program e¤ects, we have examined only one, the rst, year of that phase of
the Act which was the smallest among the three phases of the NREGA rollout, covering
merely a fth of Indias rural population. Since then the NREGAs scale has further
grown, from about 2.1 billion person-days in the scal year 2008-09 to 2.3 billion person-
days in 2012-13. Moreover, several important design features, including mandatory bank
payments and administrative processes such as linking the NREGA with Indias Unique
Identication Project have been added. Hence, a comprehensive analysis of the Acts
welfare impacts since its inception is warranted, but the methodological challenges of
such an endeavor appear to prevail.
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Figure 1: Phase-wise Rollout of the NREGA Across Districts
Figure 2: NREGA Wage Costs
Figure 3: Probability of NREGA Phase II Status by Centered Rank
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Figure 4: NREGA E¤ect on Mean Logarithmic Monthly per Capita Con-
sumption Expenditures by Households Belonging to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes
Figure 5: Estimated E¤ect of the NREGA on Seasonal Consumption Patterns
Figure 6: Mean Logarithmic Monthly per Capita Consumption Expenditures
by Rural Households Belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
NREGA Phase II and III Districts and All-India Food Grain Production by
Agricultural Season
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Table 1: NREGA Facts for Phase II Sample Districts
NREGA Expenditures in Phase II Sample Districts
Total Expenditures (in million INR) 29; 926:17
Expenditures on Wages (in million INR) 21; 437:76
Share of Exp. on Wages in Total Exp. (in %) 71:64
Population in Phase II Sample Districts
Rural Population (in million) 149:41
Rural Households (in million) 25:50
Rural SC/ST Population (in million) 38:74
Rural SC/ST Households (in million) 7:11
NREGA Employment in Phase II Sample Districts
Households Employed under the NREGA (in million) 8:99
Percentage of Rural Households Employed under the NREGA 35:27
NREGA Person-Days in Phase II Sample Districts
Total Person-Days (in million) 287:14
Person-Days per Rural Population 1:92
Person-Days per Rural Household 11:26
SC/ST Person-Days (in million) 136:05
SC/ST Person-Days per SC/ST Population 3:51
SC/ST Person-Days per SC/ST Household 19:14
Observations 92
Notes: NREGA gures pertain to the scal year 2007-08 (April 2007 to March 2008),
are in current Indian Rupees, and are calculated from district-wise statistics published by the
Ministry of Rural Development (Government of India, 2013c).
Population totals are calculated from district-wise Census 2001 gures (Government of India, 2001).
Household size estimates from NSS data as set out in column 4 of the center panel in Tables 2 and 3
are used to calculate the number of rural households and SC/ST households.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for All Rural Households
2006-07 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
Phase II and Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 643:71 651:36 636:46 670:09 672:96 667:20
Log. MPCE 631:80 632:94 630:71 637:47 636:76 638:18
HCR 35:60 35:89 35:33 29:31 30:29 28:32
PGR 7:66 7:45 7:86 5:38 5:87 4:89
Household Size 6:10 6:07 6:13 5:93 6:03 5:82
Crank 3:04 3:73 2:38 3:33 3:32 3:34
SC/STa (in %) 29:34 27:89 30:71 26:37 25:60 27:15
Laborers (in %) 38:62 39:62 37:68 36:10 35:31 36:89
Observations 14; 860 7; 446 7; 414 12; 901 6; 456 6; 445
Districts 255 255 255 255 255 255
Phase II Sample Districts
MPCE 558:44 585:65 535:42 587:13 590:04 584:27
Log. MPCE 619:50 622:88 616:64 627:09 627:38 626:80
HCR 42:85 41:69 43:84 34:98 34:22 35:72
PGR 9:90 9:20 10:49 6:54 6:59 6:49
Household Size 6:20 6:06 6:32 5:86 5:89 5:83
Crank  2:27  1:43  2:98  1:91  2:00  1:82
SC/STa (in %) 34:99 31:50 37:94 29:80 27:90 31:65
Laborers (in %) 40:69 42:81 38:90 37:17 37:26 37:09
Observations 5; 703 2; 856 2; 847 5; 450 2; 728 2; 722
Districts 92 92 92 92 92 92
Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 711:14 698:20 724:54 728:64 730:19 727:06
Log. MPCE 641:52 640:11 642:98 644:80 643:24 646:40
HCR 29:87 31:75 27:92 25:31 27:58 22:97
PGR 5:89 6:20 5:56 4:56 5:36 3:74
Household Size 6:02 6:07 5:96 5:98 6:13 5:82
Crank 7:23 7:41 7:04 7:03 6:99 7:07
SC/STa (in %) 24:87 25:32 24:41 23:95 24:01 23:89
Laborers (in %) 36:99 37:36 36:61 35:34 33:97 36:74
Observations 9; 157 4; 590 4; 567 7; 451 3; 728 3; 723
Districts 163 163 163 163 163 163
a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Notes: Calculated from NSS rounds 63 and 64.
"Log. MPCE" is the natural logarithm of monthly per capita consumption expenditures, multiplied by 100.
Individual weights provided by the NSSO are used so that all gures are representative for the rural population
of individuals.
"Fall" and "Spring" include observations from July to December and from January to June, respectively.
The sample is restricted to Phase II and Phase III districts for which the Planning Commission Backwardness
Index is available.
All measures in 2004-05 constant prices using monthly CPI-ALs, and state-wise Tendulkar poverty lines for 2004-05.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Rural Households Belonging to Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes
2006-07 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
Phase II and Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 496:93 511:59 484:32 547:39 542:60 551:94
Log. MPCE 610:19 614:25 606:69 621:52 619:85 623:10
HCR 52:72 49:03 55:90 42:56 43:80 41:39
PGR 13:50 12:06 14:74 8:61 9:73 7:55
Household Size 6:20 5:84 6:51 5:60 5:70 5:51
Crank 1:97 2:85 1:22 2:53 2:70 2:37
Laborers (in %) 57:13 61:17 53:65 58:64 56:36 60:81
Observations 3; 579 1; 785 1; 794 2; 724 1; 352 1; 372
Districts 253 239 245 252 240 238
Phase II Sample Districts
MPCE 446:23 494:02 412:67 517:34 511:50 522:40
Log. MPCE 599:00 609:55 591:58 615:88 614:50 617:07
HCR 61:44 50:25 69:31 46:35 46:50 46:21
PGR 17:25 13:60 19:80 9:57 10:32 8:92
Household Size 6:59 5:86 7:10 5:45 5:53 5:38
Crank  3:34  3:35  3:33  2:44  2:48  2:40
Laborers (in %) 53:15 55:03 51:83 56:31 52:78 59:36
Observations 1; 661 829 832 1; 341 643 698
Districts 92 86 90 92 91 89
Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 553:33 527:17 581:40 573:77 567:54 580:19
Log. MPCE 622:64 618:42 627:17 626:47 624:14 628:87
HCR 43:02 47:94 37:74 39:24 41:63 36:78
PGR 9:33 10:69 7:87 7:77 9:25 6:25
Household Size 5:77 5:82 5:71 5:73 5:83 5:63
Crank 7:87 8:34 7:37 6:89 6:86 6:92
Laborers (in %) 61:56 66:62 56:12 60:69 59:23 62:21
Observations 1; 918 956 962 1; 383 709 674
Districts 161 153 155 160 149 149
Notes: See Table 2.
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for Rural Households whose Principal Occu-
pation is Labor
2006-07 2007-08
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
Phase II and Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 513:49 517:71 509:28 549:31 540:36 557:95
Log. MPCE 612:34 613:87 610:82 621:66 620:45 622:81
HCR 51:41 52:09 50:72 42:83 43:75 41:94
PGR 12:33 11:99 12:67 8:47 8:89 8:06
Household Size 5:59 5:75 5:43 5:37 5:43 5:33
Crank 2:91 3:86 1:96 3:03 3:12 2:94
SC/STa (in %) 43:40 43:06 43:74 42:84 40:86 44:75
Observations 5; 299 2; 648 2; 651 2; 898 1; 405 1; 493
Districts 255 252 252 254 249 246
Phase II Sample Districts
MPCE 439:18 451:64 427:59 495:05 505:88 484:38
Log. MPCE 599:67 603:10 596:48 612:67 614:90 610:48
HCR 59:39 57:64 61:01 49:31 45:60 52:96
PGR 15:59 14:28 16:81 10:12 9:43 10:80
Household Size 5:64 5:91 5:39 5:35 5:35 5:34
Crank  2:43  1:65  3:17  2:12  1:85  2:40
SC/STa (in %) 45:70 40:50 50:55 45:13 39:53 50:66
Observations 2; 050 1; 039 1; 011 1; 254 616 638
Districts 92 89 91 92 91 89
Phase III Sample Districts
MPCE 578:14 571:68 584:96 589:60 566:46 611:55
Log. MPCE 623:36 622:66 624:10 628:32 624:66 631:80
HCR 44:46 47:55 41:19 38:02 42:36 33:90
PGR 9:50 10:12 8:84 7:25 8:49 6:07
Household Size 5:54 5:61 5:47 5:40 5:48 5:31
Crank 7:56 8:36 6:71 6:85 6:89 6:82
SC/STa (in %) 41:40 45:16 37:43 41:14 41:86 40:45
Observations 3; 249 1; 609 1; 640 1; 644 789 855
Districts 163 163 161 162 158 157
a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Notes: See Table 2.
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Table A5: Sample Means for Various Years of NSS Consumption Surveys,
Rural Households Belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Phase II Phase III
All Year Fall Spring All Year Fall Spring
2003-04 (59th/60th Round) 2003-04 (59th/60th Round)
MPCE 511:49 529:96 500:53 562:68 536:43 577:47
Log. MPCE 613:16 615:65 611:67 621:96 618:66 623:83
HCR 48:20 44:19 50:58 44:95 48:40 43:00
PGR 11:29 10:26 11:90 9:31 11:12 8:29
Observations 1; 641 756 885 1; 677 753 924
2004-05 (61st Round) 2004-05 (61st Round)
MPCE 462:22 461:45 463:00 489:74 488:41 491:07
Log. MPCE 604:07 604:46 603:68 610:33 609:48 611:18
HCR 57:69 57:72 57:67 56:80 57:64 55:95
PGR 14:32 14:12 14:52 13:49 14:09 12:88
Observations 3; 556 1; 807 1; 749 4; 390 2; 168 2; 222
2005-06 (62nd Round) 2005-06 (62nd Round)
MPCE 487:40 507:22 469:71 536:51 532:65 540:39
Log. MPCE 608:94 613:91 604:50 619:95 618:85 621:06
HCR 53:36 46:21 59:75 44:46 46:98 41:93
PGR 13:55 10:82 15:98 10:19 11:28 9:10
Observations 697 333 364 934 447 487
2006-07 (63rd Round) 2006-07 (63rd Round)
MPCE 446:23 494:02 412:67 553:33 526:26 582:13
Log. MPCE 599:00 609:55 591:58 622:64 618:25 627:31
HCR 61:44 50:25 69:31 43:02 48:14 37:57
PGR 17:25 13:60 19:80 9:33 10:73 7:84
Observations 1; 661 829 832 1; 918 947 971
2007-08 (64th Round) 2007-08 (64th Round)
MPCE 517:34 511:50 522:40 573:77 567:20 580:53
Log. MPCE 615:88 614:50 617:07 626:47 624:09 628:91
HCR 46:35 46:50 46:21 39:24 41:67 36:75
PGR 9:57 10:32 8:92 7:77 9:25 6:25
Observations 1; 341 643 698 1; 383 707 676
2009-10 (66th Round) 2009-10 (66th Round)
MPCE 506:14 519:56 492:04 576:50 588:12 564:10
Log. MPCE 612:47 614:55 610:30 626:66 627:98 625:25
HCR 50:20 50:12 50:29 38:05 38:09 38:00
PGR 11:87 11:26 12:52 7:49 7:56 7:42
Observations 2; 677 1; 295 1; 382 3; 490 1; 795 1; 695
2011-12 (68th Round) 2011-12 (68th Round)
MPCE 590:03 590:71 589:34 682:28 680:68 683:64
Log. MPCE 627:65 627:07 628:22 642:05 641:40 642:61
HCR 33:21 34:46 31:97 22:69 23:38 22:10
PGR 6:91 7:88 5:96 4:01 4:49 3:61
Observations 2; 462 1; 206 1; 256 3; 128 1; 521 1; 607
See Table 2, except for data.
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